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PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully believe that the Appellate Court's opinion in this 
matter either misapprehended the facts or law in the following particulars: 
1. Opportunity to Conduct Full and Fair Discovery. The April 2000 scheduling order 
would not in and of itself have necessarily been a problem for JMS, if CAT had not used 
that order as a tool to refuse to allow JMS to take any depositions other than those 
identified in that Order - until all of those depositions were completed. It was Judge 
Bohling's subsequent refusal to allow JMS sufficient time to take the extra depositions 
needed to develop this case which deprived JMS of a full and fair opportunity to conduct 
discovery. The Appellate Court's opinion seems to gloss over this problem. Yes, it was 
true that initially Plaintiffs acquiesced in the April 2000 order. But, when the discovery 
period ran and there had been no opportunity to take the extra needed depositions, JMS 
did start to object. And, the Appellate Court's opinion does not accurately recite the facts 
when it states that "the trial court and CAT granted JMS several extensions in response to 
JMS' claims that it needed more time to take depositions." Yes, "extensions" were 
granted; but JMS still had its hands tied during each such extension. During the 
approximately 90 days total of "extra time," JMS was only allowed to complete the 
depositions of Taggart and Coats (delayed because CAT had wrongfully held back and 
not produced critical daytimer documents during the original discovery period) and take 
a very few other depositions. In its 56(f) and other motions, JMS and Aspenwood 
complained vehemently that they needed to take several dozen depositions. AT NO 
TIME DURING THE DISCOVERY PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY TWELVE 
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MONTHS TOTAL, WAS JMS OR ASPENWOOD EVER FREE TO TAKE ALL OF 
THE DEPOSITIONS THAT THEY WANTED OR NEEDED. Given a case as complex 
as this case, twelve months of unfettered discovery time would likely not have been 
sufficient to fully prepare plaintiffs' case. But, when JMS was never free at any time 
during that twelve months to take all of the depositions that it wanted, JMS was deprived 
of a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery. Perhaps Judge Bohling's April 2000 
order was not in and of itself objectionable, and perhaps CAT should not have been 
sanctioned for withholding documents, etc., BUT JMS SHOULD HAVE HAD A FAIR 
OPPORTUNITY TO DO ITS DISCOVERY WITHOUT HAVING ITS HANDS TIED 
BEHIND ITS BACK. JMS' due process rights were denied by the application of the 
April 2000 order, and Judge Bohling's subsequent refusal to lift the restrictions which 
had been placed on JMS' ability to fully and fairly conduct discovery. 
2. Rule 56(f) Motion Should Have Been Granted. The Appellate Court correctly states 
that the law and rules require that a 56(f) motion be supported by an affidavit stating the 
reasons the party opposing the summary judgment motion "is presently unable to present 
evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to summary judgment." But the 
Court then mischaracterizes the facts by stating that Aspenwood did not meet this burden, 
and that while the motion was pending Aspenwood's "priorities have not been to try to 
establish criteria to dispute the motion for summary judgment, but rather to pursue other 
matters ...." The Rule 56(f) Declarations of David C. Condie and Dan Mehr fully satisfy 
the requirements of the case law quoted in the opinion and then above. Furthermore, the 
reason that Aspenwood did not take the depositions that it needed and wanted to take 
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during the pendancy of the motion was that CAT refused to allow them due to the April 
2000 order, and Judge Bohling would not open up discovery so that they could be taken. 
It is a pretty cheap shot for CAT to claim that we did not take depositions, when we were 
precluded from taking those depositions. Finally, the evidence produced and submitted by 
Aspenwood and JMS in opposition to CAT's claim that the corporate veil should not be 
pierced was sufficient for a jury to find in Aspenwood and JMS' favor. IT IS 
ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE THAT JMS LACKED DILIGENCE IN PURSUING 
DISCOVERY. 
3. Failure to Fund Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed. The Appellate Court's 
determination is based in significant part on an incomplete description of Aspenwood's 
position: "[Aspenwood] contends that Mehr, Taggart and Coats entered into an oral 
agreement prior to signing the Operating Agreement." It is true that Mehr and 
Aspenwood claimed that Taggart and Coats had agreed to fund projects prior to the 
Operating Agreement being signed. But - Mehr and Aspenwood also alleged under oath 
that AFTER THE OPERATING AGREEMENT was signed, Mehr, Taggart and Coats 
met to go through all of Taggart's due diligence, and that they selected the projects that 
they would have Aspenwood pursue, and that Taggart and Coats reaffirmed their 
agreement to provide all the funding necessary to develop those specifically selected 
projects. This oral agreement was based upon specific information (the extensive due 
diligence that Taggart had performed), and it was to provide funding for amounts which 
Taggart had specifically and in detail had set forth in Taggart's detailed projections for 
each of the selected projects. There was no guess work. The projects were reviewed, 
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analyzed, voted and agreed upon. Taggart and Coats knew what the projected costs were 
going to be, and knowingly agreed to provide the funding for those costs. This was a 
fully enforceable oral agreement. The Appellate Court's analysis completely ignores this 
critical testimony, and does not apply to this fact situation. 
4. The Court's Waiver of Jury Trial Analysis Ignores Judge Bohling's Representations 
Which JMS Reasonably Relied Upon. This Court's "waiver" analysis ignores JMS' 
testimony from two attorneys as to Judge Bohling's promise that -although the box for 
"nonjury trial" would be checked on the scheduling order - JMS would get a jury trial if 
JMS had in fact asked for and paid for a jury. JMS did not "object" to the checking of the 
"nonjury trial" box because it relied upon Judge Bohling's promise and representation. 
JMS was induced to not object to Judge Bohling's checking of this "nonjury trial" box in 
reliance upon Judge Bohling's promise and representation that JMS would get a jury trial. 
JMS legitimately feels like Judge Bohling has negligently defrauded JMS of its 
fundamental right to trial by jury. None of the cases cited by the Appellate Court involve 
a situation where the trial Court had "faked out" a party into initially allowing a "nonjury 
trial" box to be checked, with a promise that a jury trial will be granted if one was asked 
for - and are all therefore absolutely inapposite. JMS' version of these facts must be 
deemed to be true, and a waiver not found. 
5. JMS is Not Aware of Any Rule Which Precludes the Marshalling of Evidence in an 
Addendum. JMS is absolutely stunned by the Appellate Court's analysis on the 
marshaling of evidence. JMS is not aware of, nor does the Appellate Court cite to, any 
rales which require that the marshaled evidence be placed in the body of the Appellant's 
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Brief. It cannot be fatal that the marshaled evidence be set forth in an addendum. The 
Appellate Court does cite a case which states that it is improper to cite to a trial court 
memorandum in lieu of an argument. But this case does not state that you cannot marshal 
the evidence in an addendum. Rule 24(a)(l 1) does not state that ONLY those items 
identified therein may be placed in an addendum. It states that those items so identified 
MUST BE incorporated in an addendum. Trial involving extensive testimony may often 
require marshaling of evidence that is so extensive - such as in this case - that the BEST 
PLACE for that marshaled evidence to be put is in an addendum. How can you place a 
page limit on a marshaling requirement? You cannot limit the number of pages for your 
marshaled evidence.' Marshaling is a function of the extent of the relevant evidence. 
Further, JMS cannot see any possible justification for the Court's conclusion that "JMS 
has not attempted to meet its burden of demonstrating taht despite the marshaled evidence 
supporting the findings, 'the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'" JMS' 
Addendum 6 exhaustively marshaled the evidence and demonstrated conclusively that the 
critical facts were ADMITTED by CAT and Taggart. 
6. Rule 69 Does Not Grant Authority to Examine Non-Parties. This Court makes an 
error when it cavalierly states that Hal Rosen could be asked questions about the assets 
and affairs of the non-parties - JMS Meadow and JMS Brook. Even Judge Bohling 
initially recognized that Rule 69 only requires "the judgment creditor" to appear and 
answer questions. Rosen, as a representative of JMS Meadow and JMS Brook, should 
not have been called to answer questions about the assets of these non-parties under Rule 
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69 This is a critical issue for trial practitioners We serve or defend against Orders in 
Supplemental Proceedings under Rule 69 all of the time There has to be precision in this 
Court's directions and rulings as to who can be required to attend, and the scope of the 
inquiry This Court's opinion in this regard significantly expands the scope of who can be 
brought m under Rule 69 It should only be the judgment debtor itself No one else And 
only the judgment debtor's assets should be the scope of the inquiry- not the assets of 
some other entity m which the judgment debtor may own some stock 
7 Rosen Fully And Properly Answered AH Relevant Questions Posed to Him When 
Judge Bohlmg ruled that Rosen should appear and answer questions, Judge Bohlmg 
properly limited the inquiry However, after the deposition was taken, CAT complained 
that Rosen would not answer questions which Judge Bohlmg's prior ruling had clearly 
indicated would be "out of bounds " This Court mischaractenzes Judge Bohlmg's earlier 
ruling by stating that "the tnal court had ordered Rosen to appear and provide CAT with 
full discovery of JMS Financial, JMS Hidden, and other related entities' assets available 
for execution or that otherwise might become the basis for recovery " That is not what 
Judge Bohlmg originally ruled Further, Rosen did m fact comply with Judge Bohlmg's 
first ruling When the second hearing was held - where Rosen was sanctioned - Rosen's 
deposition transcript was not even before the Court Bohlmg ruled based solely upon 
CAT's counsel's representations as to what happened - which were outrageously false 
This Court, just like Judge Bohlmg, obviously has not reviewed Rosen's deposition 
transcript Because - it it had - it would quickly become apparent that Rosen answered 
fully and in good faith all questions which were m the scope of what Judge Bohlmg had 
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previously ordered. Rosen should not have been sanctioned. THE RECORD does not 
support it. 
8. The Preliminary Injunction Was Wildly Extra-iurisdictional and Violative of 
Aspenwood's Due Process Rights. The record does not reflect that Ms. Mona Burton 
acquiesced in the injunction. Ms. Burton objected to it and stated that she did not feel 
like it was proper. This Court entirely ignores the law of limited liability companies and 
the fact that creditors of members do not have the right to interfere with the internal 
affairs of a limited liability company. Further this Court's construction of Rule 69(q) to 
allow a trial court to effectively place a non-party into receivership is an breathtakingly 
broad expansion of a trial court's jurisdiction and power. Aspenwood did not hold any 
property of JMS', nor did it dispute that it owed any money to JMS. Further, Rule 69(q) 
only allows an injunction until " a judgment creditor" could "bring an action to determine 
such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judgment." Judge Bohling purported to 
take control over and direct what Aspenwood could do with its property and its affairs. 
This runs afoul of the plain language of Rule 69(q). The injunction as imposed was 
improper and in violation of Rule 69(q) and should be reversed. 
DATED the 21st day of February, 2003. 
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